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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation studies the roles of interest rates in currency crises. Existing 
studies in the literature suggest that high interest rates can play two different roles. 
The first role is an attack deterrent: a monetary authority can potentially deter a 
speculative attack at the first place by raising interest rates ex ante to reveal its 
willingness and ability to defend the currency. The second role is a weapon of defense: 
once an attack has already been launched, a monetary authority can possibly defend 
the currency by raising interest rates to increase speculators’ costs. A graphical 
illustration of the roles of interest rates is presented in Figure 1. 
The first chapter of my dissertation studies the attack deterrence effect of high 
interest rates. In this chapter, I present a signaling model of raising the interest rate as 
a deterrent to speculative attacks and then test the model using a dataset that covers 
54 countries from March 1964 through December 2000. Incorporating uncertainty 
over the speculator’s type into a standard signaling model, I am able to show that 
unsuccessful signaling can be equilibrium behavior in either a pooling equilibrium or 
a semi-separating equilibrium. The model also implies that, although it is still 
possible for a weak monetary authority to hide his type in a pooling or 
semi-separating equilibrium, in both cases, the weak monetary authority faces a 
higher probability of an attack. In the empirical part of this paper, I find evidence that 
raising interest rates in advance has significantly different impacts in different country 
groups. It significantly reduces the probability of attacks in countries that have a de 
facto hard peg but increases it in de facto soft-pegging countries. This finding is 
viii 
robust to alternative measure of monetary policy and to different specifications and 
samples. These results clearly support the predictions of the theoretical model.  
The second chapter presents a theoretical model of interest rate defenses against 
speculative attacks. Given that a high interest rate can be a double-edged sword, I 
argue that the battle between speculators and the government can be well modeled as 
a war of attrition game under asymmetric information. I then solve for a pure strategy 
weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which each party’s time until concession 
depends on their benefits from winning and their costs of fighting. Using this model, I 
am able to produce results that are novel for the speculative attack literature. First, the 
model shows that failed defenses (attacks) can be ex-ante rational for governments 
(speculators). Second, the model predicts systematic variations in the durations of 
interest rate defenses and I find some support for these predictions in the context of 
attacks in 1997 and 1998. Finally, the model suggests that the relation between 
interest rates and the outcome of a defense is likely to be nonlinear, which is 
consistent with existing empirical evidence. 
Chapter three empirically tests the effectiveness of interest rate defenses against 
speculative attacks. It is shown that previous empirical studies on this issue suffer a 
classic sample selection problem by restricting their sample observations to crisis 
periods only. To correct this selectivity bias, I employ the full information maximum 
likelihood method to a large unbalanced panel dataset that covers both crisis periods 
and peaceful periods. I also develop a rare-events-corrected probit model with sample 
selection that can be used to correct a second bias that is created by the rare events 
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data used to estimate the selection equation. My empirical results show there is no 
significant statistical relationship between the interest rate and the outcome of a 
speculative attack. 
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Figure 1 A Graphical Illustration of the Roles of Interest Rates 
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Chapter One 
 
Do High Interest Rates Deter Speculative Attacks? 
----Theory and Evidence 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Can raising interest rates ex-ante deter speculative attacks? Is the effect of 
interest rate signaling the same for all monetary authorities? If interest rate signaling 
is costly, why do we seem to see monetary authorities often use it to no effect? 
Recent work (Drazen (1999), Drazen (2001), Angeletos et al. (2003)) 
emphasizes the signaling effect of high interest rates as a deterrent. In these papers, a 
monetary authority can potentially deter a potential attack at the first place by raising 
short-term interest rates ex ante to signal its willingness and ability to defend the 
currency.1
These papers make important contribution to the literature by correctly pointing 
out the signaling effect of high interest rates. However, there is still some room for 
further progress. First of all, none of these models is able to justify the failed 
signaling observed in reality without relying on out-of-equilibrium beliefs.2 More 
importantly, they predict that the signal sent by different types of government will be 
equally effective, which, as we will see, is an idea that is strongly rejected by the 
empirical evidence we present below.  
In the theoretical part of this paper, we introduce the uncertainty over the 
speculator’s characteristics to the standard signaling model. This simple modification 
 
1 Many other papers study the effectiveness of an interest rate defense once an attack has been launched, which is 
a different issue than what we study here. See for example, Bensaid and Jeanne (1997), Flood and Jeanne (2000), 
Lahiri and Vegh (2003), and Grier and Lin (2005). 
2 Failed signaling can be justified in a semi-separating equilibrium in other standard signaling models.  
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generates novel results. It allows us to show that a monetary authority can be attacked 
in either a pooling equilibrium or a semi-separating equilibrium even if he signals. 
Therefore, ex ante rationality of failed signaling (also attacks) can be justified in our 
model without relying on any out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Furthermore, it enables us to 
show explicitly that signaling is more effective for countries that have a strong 
commitment to exchange rate stability. This prediction is strongly supported by the 
evidence found in the empirical part of our paper.  
Existing empirical studies in the literature have focused on testing whether 
raising interest rates influences the outcome of a speculative attack.3 In this paper 
we present the first empirical evidence on whether raising interest rates ex-ante can 
deter a speculative attack. Drawing evidence from a large unbalanced panel dataset 
that includes 54 countries over the period from March 1964 through December 2000, 
we find robust evidence that high rates do reduce the probability of a potential 
speculative attack in countries that have a credible de facto fixed exchange rate 
regime but not in soft-pegging countries. This evidence supports the predictions of 
our theoretical model. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the literature. In 
Section 3, we fix ideas by studying a simple theoretical model. Section 4 discusses 
data issues, especially how to measure attacks. Section 5 contains our results, and 
section 6 concludes. 
1.2 The Literature 
The signaling hypothesis was first formalized by Allan Drazen. In a series of 
papers (Drazen 1999, 2001), he argues that a major effect of high interest rates is as a 
 
3 These studies include Kraay (2003), Hubrich (2000), and Drazen and Hubrich (2003). 
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signal of the government's willingness or ability to defend the exchange rate. Given 
imperfect information about the government characteristics, speculators use observed 
government policies to update the probability they assign to future devaluation. Thus, 
a high interest rate can signal the government's high value of the peg or strong fiscal 
position and can potentially deter a speculative attack. 
Angeletos et al. (2003) study the effectiveness of signaling in environments 
where market participants play a global coordination game with information 
heterogeneity. In their model, signals are received by speculators with idiosyncratic 
noise and government policy is endogenous. There is an inactive-policy equilibrium 
in which speculators coordinate on “ignoring” any attempt of the government to 
affect market behavior and the government chooses not to signal. This happens when 
the fundamentals are either very strong or very weak. If the fundamentals are neither 
too weak nor too strong, there exists a continuum of active-policy equilibria in which 
the government chooses to signal. Upon observing the signal, the speculators 
coordinate on either an aggressive or a lenient course of action. In an “active-policy” 
equilibrium, the government has to raise the interest rate to a certain level, which is 
determined by arbitrary aggressiveness of speculators, to meet the market expectation 
and thus avoid attacks.  
As discussed earlier, these models all have difficulty allowing failed signaling, 
which seems to be often observed in reality, without relying on any 
out-of-equilibrium beliefs. 
While direct empirical testing of this issue has not been done, there are related 
empirical studies which investigate whether high interest rates help defend currencies 
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during speculative attacks. Kraay (2003) is probably the first and most influential 
examination of this issue. Drawing on large sample evidence, he finds no evidence 
that high interest rates help defend exchange rates, nor can he find evidence that high 
interest rates have any significant perverse effects.  
Following Kraay’s approach, Hubrich (2000) employs the same type of data but 
using simpler statistical methods to reinvestigate this issue. He argues that Kraay’s 
result is due mainly to how he defines the policy variable. Using variations of Kraay’s 
policy variables, he finds significant, but contradictory, results. In his paper, raising 
discount rates significantly lowers the chances of a successful defense but reducing 
domestic credit significantly helps defend the exchange rate.  
Drazen and Hubrich (2003) argue that such direct tests of the effectiveness of 
interest rate defenses are likely to get inconclusive results due to offsetting effects. By 
disaggregating the impact of interest rate defense into the effects on future interest 
rates differentials, expectation of future exchange rates, and risk premia, they find 
that raising the interest rates strengthens the exchange rate over the short-run but 
leads to an expected depreciation and an increase in the risk premium at a horizon of 
a year and longer.  
Furman and Stiglitz (1998) use daily data on interest rates and exchange rates of 
nine emerging economies from January 1992 to June 1998 to test whether high 
interest rates help defend the domestic currency. They find a negative relationship 
between either the magnitude of the interest rate hike or its duration and the eventual 
outcome of the exchange rate.  Using daily data for five Southeast Asian countries, 
Goldfajn and Baig (1998) fail to find any significant impacts of monetary policy on 
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exchange rates. Using weekly data from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Mexico, Gould and Kamin (2000) find that credit spreads and stock 
prices have significant impacts on exchange rates during financial crises, while 
interest rates do not.  
In sum, evidence that interest rate increases significantly help monetary 
authorities win speculative attacks is mixed at best, while do date, there is no existing 
evidence on our question of interest: can ex-ante interest rate increases deter attacks? 
1.3 A Simple Model of Signaling 
To fix ideas and directly motivate our empirical tests, we present a simple 
two-stage signaling model. We show that, in both a pooling and a semi-separating 
equilibrium, both types of monetary authorities would signal, but one type of 
monetary authority can more effectively deter an attack than the other. In a separating 
equilibrium, only one type signals and deters attacks successfully. 
A. Setup of the Model 
There are two risk-neutral agents, a monetary authority and a representative 
speculator in the model. The monetary authority has two possible types: Strong 
( 1=θ ) and Weak ( 2=θ ).  The strong monetary authority has a higher level of 
commitment on exchange rate stability than does the weak monetary authority. There 
are also two types of speculator: an informed speculator who can directly observe the 
monetary authority’s type and an uninformed speculator who cannot. The 
speculator’s type is private information to both types of monetary authority while by 
construction the monetary authority’s type is only private to the uninformed 
speculator. Uncertainty over the speculator’s type turns out to be crucial for 
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generating ex ante rational, but unsuccessful, signaling in a pooling equilibrium or in 
a semi-separating equilibrium. We will let s denote the prior probability that the 
monetary authority is strong and p denote the prior probability that the speculator is 
informed.  
The model has two stages. At the first stage, the monetary authority chooses the 
interest rate. At the second stage, the speculator makes his attack decision upon 
observing the rate.4 Although the observed interest rate is not informative to the 
informed speculator, it can still be used by the uninformed speculator to update his 
prior belief, s== )1(θµ .
Assuming no discounting, a monetary authority’s loss function can be written as: 
θθ ZVrCL += )(     =θ 1; 2 
where Z takes on the value one if a speculative attack occurs at the second stage and 
zero otherwise. )(rC is strictly increasing for any 0≥r and 0)0( =C . It can be 
considered as the cost of signaling (the cost associated with deviating from the 
optimal interest rate). For simplicity, the optimal interest rate is normalized to be zero 
and the cost of signaling is assumed to be the same for both types of monetary 
authorities. θV can be interpreted as the expected cost (weighted cost conditional on 
the outcome) of defending the peg after an attack. To make our model interesting, we 
assume that 21 VV > .
Both types of speculators share a common payoff function: 
)( KMZU −= π
4 Allowing speculator to signal its own type before the monetary authority moves will not change the 
results of our model for there is no need for the informed speculator to reveal or hide its type.  
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where Z is the indicator variable defined above. K can be interpreted as a fixed cost 
associated with launching a speculative attack. M is the potential benefit to the 
speculator if an attack turns out to be successful and is assumed to be greater than K .
π is the probability of a successful attack. Without loss of generality, the probability 
is assumed to be zero if the monetary authority is strong and one if the monetary 
authority is weak... Therefore, an informed speculator always attacks weak types but 
never attacks strong types. )(rC , 1V , 2V , K , M , p and s are all assumed to be 
common knowledge.  
B. Solving for Equilibria 
First, we solve for the separating equilibria of the model. A separating 
equilibrium is the one where the two types of monetary authorities choose different 
actions at the first stage. The weak monetary authority will choose not to raise the 
interest rate because it is too costly for him to imitate the strong monetary authority.  
As a result, upon observing the interest rate any speculator can correctly infer the type 
of the monetary authority. Therefore, the conditions for a separating equilibrium are: 
2
*
1 )1()()1( VprCVp −≥≥− , 1)|1( * === rrθµ , 0)|1( * =≠= rrθµ
The first condition states that, for a strong monetary authority, the cost of raising the 
interest rate to *r at the first stage is less than the expected cost of not doing so. The 
second condition ensures that it does not pay for a weak monetary authority to imitate 
a strong monetary authority because the expected total loss conditional on signaling 
( *)(2 rCpV + ) exceeds the expected loss of no signaling ( 2V ).5 Upon observing the 
interest rate, the uninformed speculator will assign a probability, 1)|1( * === rrθµ
5 Note that the existence of a potential informed speculator at the second stage reduces both types of 
monetary authorities’ incentive to signal. 
8
and 0)|1( * =≠= rrθµ to the monetary authority's type. 
It is easy to see that, for certain functional forms of )(rC and values of 1V , 2V ,
K and M , there exists a continuum of separating equilibria in which a strong 
monetary authority chooses an interest rate *r , ],[ 12* rrr ∈ , where 
))1(( 212 VpCr −= − and ))1(( 111 VpCr −= − , and a weak  monetary authority 
chooses the optimal interest rate at the first stage. Both types of speculator would 
attack (not attack) the weak (strong) type.  
Next, we solve for the pooling equilibria of the model. In a pooling equilibrium, 
both types of monetary authority would choose to signal at the first stage so the signal 
does not help an uninformed speculator update his prior belief. Therefore, there exists 
a continuum of pooling equilibria if: 
],0[* 2rr ∈ , and MKMsrr /)()1(*)|1( −>===== θµθµ , 0)|1( * =≠= rrθµ
The first condition states that both types of monetary authority would find it 
profitable to signal. The next one ensures that an uninformed speculator would not 
attack at the second stage upon observing the signal. Note that in our pooling 
equilibrium the weak monetary authority will be attacked with probability p , the 
probability that the speculator is informed, even he signals. However, signaling is still 
rational ex ante. Therefore, our model allows unsuccessful signaling in equilibrium.  
No pooling equilibrium exists when MKMs /)( −< . However, there is a 
continuum of semi-separating equilibria in which the strong monetary authority 
signals and the weak monetary authority and the uninformed speculator play mixed 
strategies. The weak monetary randomly signals with probability q to make the 
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uninformed speculator indifferent between attacking and not attacking in equilibrium 
and the uninformed speculator randomly attacks with a probability t so that the weak 
monetary authority will find itself indifferent between signaling and not signaling. 
The strong monetary authority still signals. The uninformed speculator updates his 
belief upon observing the monetary authority’s action according to Bayes rule. 
Therefore, the conditions for having these equilibria are: 
MKMs /)( −< , ],0(* 2rr ∈ , )]1)(/[( sKMKsq −−= ,
22 )1/(*)]()1[( VprCVpt −−−= , ])1(/[)|1( * qsssrr −+===θµ ,
0)|1( * =≠= rrθµ
In a semi-separating equilibrium, both types can be attacked. The probability of attack 
for a strong monetary authority is tp)1( − while the probability of attack for a weak 
monetary authority is tpp )1( −+ .
This model, though simple, has important implications that are not found in the 
existing literature.  In particular, our model allows for ex ante rational failed 
signaling without relying on any out-of-equilibrium beliefs. The other novel feature 
of the model is that it gives an explicit prediction on the relative effectiveness of 
signaling. We show that in either a pooling equilibrium or a semi-separating 
equilibrium, the probability of attack for a weak monetary authority who signals is 
greater than that for a strong monetary authority who signals.   
This is exactly what we want to test in the following empirical part of our paper: 
do countries with strong preferences for exchange rate stability deter attacks by 
raising rates more effectively than countries with less strong preferences?  
1.4 Data Issues 
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A. Sample Coverage and Data Sources 
The unbalanced panel dataset that we created for this study covers 54 countries, 
both developed and developing, from March 1964 to December 2000. The data are 
drawn from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics on 
CD-ROM (IFS) (February 2004 version), Penn World Tables 6.1, and the Polity 4 
database. Detailed data sources are listed in the data appendix. 
B. Identifying Speculative Attacks 
In order to test the signaling hypothesis, we first have to identify speculative 
attacks. There are two methods to identify speculative attacks in the literature. One is 
proposed by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wypolz (1985) and the other is proposed by 
Kraay (2003). Our identification method follows that of Kraay (2003). We identify 
successful attacks and failed attacks separately, though the outcome of a speculative 
attack is not the focus of this study.  
We do three things that make our sample differ from Kraay’s. First, we include 
lower income countries, as well as middle and upper income countries, into our 
sample for we do not see any obvious benefit in excluding these countries. Second, 
our sample covers a longer period, from March 1964 to December 2000. Third, we 
restrict our sample to countries that can reasonably be considered to have a fixed 
exchange rate to defend, which Kraay does not explicitly do.6
Theoretically, the exchange rate is not a policy objective of the monetary 
authority under a freely floating exchange rate regime. It is determined by the market. 
 
6 He restricts his sample to countries that have relatively stable nominal exchange rates 12 months 
prior to an attach though. However, his method is far from perfect and he does identify some attacks in 
periods during which a country’s exchange rate regime was freely floating. For example, Kraay 
identifies a successful attack in South Africa in July 1998 even though that country has had a freely 
floating regime ever since March 1995, according to Reinhart and Rogoff’s de facto classification. 
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The monetary authority is not obligated to maintain the exchange rate at a certain 
level. In our view, it only makes sense to speak about speculative attacks and crises 
prevention in fixed exchange rate regimes.  This issue is complicated, as recent 
research shows that the official classification of exchange rate regimes reported by 
the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
often fails to describe actual country practice.7 In particular, countries that have a de 
facto peg or crawling peg are often classified as floaters. To avoid this problem, we 
use Reinhart and Rogoff (2003)’s de facto classification of exchange rate regimes.8
They classify different exchange rate arrangements into five broad categories, hard 
peg, soft peg, managed floating, freely floating and freely falling, according to their 
flexibility. We focus our attention primarily on the first two regimes. But we do 
extend our sample to including managed floating later as a robustness check.  
Following above rules, we identify a total of 38 successful attacks and 60 failed 
attacks in countries whose exchange regime is either a hard peg or a soft peg. All 
identified speculative attacks are listed in Table 1. Table 1 also lists speculative 
attacks that are identified in countries whose exchange rate regime is managed 
floating. There are 15 successful attacks and 24 failed attacks that fall into this 
category. These additional attacks will be used later as a robustness check of our 
empirical results.  
C. Measures of Monetary Policy Signals and Policymaker Type 
 
7 See Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2003).  
8 We use Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003)’s classification for Bangladesh, Rwanda and Trinidad 
and Tobago because they are not available in Reinhart and Rogoff (2003). We treat a regime as hard 
peg, soft peg, or managed floating if it is classified as fixed, dirty floating/crawling peg, or dirty 
floating in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). None of our results on interest rate signaling changes 
if we simply drop these three countries from the sample and use only Reinhart-Rogoff classified 
countries. 
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We use the monthly change in the central bank discount rate ( DIR ) as our 
primary measure of changes in monetary policy. These nominal discount rates are 
expressed as spreads over German (U.S.) nominal interest rates for the European 
(non-European) countries. In order to check the robustness of our empirical results, 
we also create an alternative measure of monetary policy. It is constructed as the 
monthly change in domestic credit growth ( DDCG ).  
As developed above, our model predicts that, on average, interest rate signaling 
will affect attack decisions differently depending on whether the signal comes from a 
strong or weak monetary authority, where in this context strong means a greater 
commitment to the fixed exchange rate regime. We operationalize the theoretical 
policymaker types by dummy variables for whether the country has a “hard” peg 
(corresponding to the strong type) or “soft” peg (the weak type) according to the 
Reinhart-Rogoff classification.9 The test of our model will be whether ex-ante 
signaling by de facto hard peggers is more effective in deterring attacks than when the 
signal is sent by a soft pegger.  
D. Economic and Political Control Variables 
We have discussed how we measure attacks and how we measure signaling. We 
wish to estimate an equation where the probability of an attack is affected by policy 
signaling, and the effect differs by the value each monetary authority places on 
maintaining the peg, which we measure by whether their peg is “hard” or “soft”.  
We also want to include other control variables in the models. Our first such 
variable ( REROV ) is a measure of real exchange overvaluation constructed as the 
 
9 Given how we make the policymaker type operational, it would be fair to say that in our model, an informed 
speculator could be one that has read Calvo and Reinhart and Reinhart and Rogoff (or always knew the 
information contained therein), while the uninformed speculator is one that only had access to the official IMF 
listings.  
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growth rate of the real effective exchange rate in the previous 12 months. This 
variable should have a positive influence on the probability of an attack as overvalued 
exchange rates are ultimately unsustainable.  
The second control variable that we employ is a measure of adequacy of reserves 
( RESIMP ). It is defined as total non-gold reserves relative to monthly import values. 
We expect RESIMP  to have a negative effect on attack probabilities. Other things 
equal, higher reserves should discourage attacks. 
 The third control variable is defined as deviation of real per capita GDP growth 
in a country from its average in the five preceding years ( DGROWTH ).  This 
variable is used to capture where a country is in any business cycle prior to the 
speculative attack.10 We create this variable because the cost of adopting tight 
monetary policies during a recession can be much higher than during a boom. The 
variables should have a negative effect on the probability of an attack.  
The fourth control variable that we consider is a dummy variable for capital 
controls ( KAPCON ). This dummy variable takes on the value one if a country has 
restrictions on capital account transactions and zero otherwise. The effect of capital 
control on currency crisis is controversial in the literature. According to conventional 
wisdom, capital control reduces the probability of attacks by limiting volatile 
short-term capital flows and helping government buy time to improve the 
fundamentals.11 
Beyond economic aggregates, political factors may have significant effects on 
 
10 Since GDP data is only available annually, we use lagged variable in our regression. Using 
interpolated data does not significantly change our results. 
11 Glick et al. (2004) show that countries without controls have a lower likelihood of currency crisis 
after controlling for self-selection bias using a matching and propensity score methodology. 
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speculators’ attack decision or the monetary authority’s cost of signaling. For these 
reasons, we also include a measure of democracy ( DEMOC ) in our statistical 
models.12 It is an eleven-point index that ranges from 0 to 10. A high index number 
represents a high level of democracy. The idea captured with this variable is that 
countries where the government can be removed by voters can less easily afford to 
defend against attacks, as defense measures are often stringent and generally 
unpopular with the electorate. Therefore, they are more likely to be attacked.  
Due to publication lags or other information imperfection, contemporaneous 
information on the fundamentals is often unavailable for potential speculators in 
reality. Therefore, we use lagged control variables rather than contemporaneous 
control variables in our statistical model.13 Table 2 provides the summary statistics of 
all the variables used in this study. 
1.5 Empirical Results 
A. The Baseline Model 
As a first step, we consider the following simple baseline model: 
titiitti FDMPATTACK υααα +++= −− 12110* (1) 
where tiATTACK * is a latent variable. We cannot not observe tiATTACK * , but we do 
observe an indicator variable tiATTACK  which equals one if 0* >tiATTACK  and 
zero otherwise. In this case, 0* >tiATTACK  if an attack occurs. DMP is a 
measure of change in monetary policy. Since our goal is to test the signaling 
 
12 We have also considered other political characteristics such as partisanship and policy decisiveness. 
We did not include them in our statistical models because we cannot find any significant impacts of 
these variables. 
13 Since observations on GDP, capital control, and democracy score are only available annually. We 
use the variables obtained in year t-1 for year t in our regressions.   
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hypothesis, we are interested in the effects of monetary policies prior to a potential 
attack. For this reason, we use lagged changes in monetary policy in equation (1). F
is a vector representing our economic and political control variables. υ is a random 
error term with zero mean and variance 2σ , which might be either logistically or 
normally distributed.  
Since the dependent variable is a binary choice variable, a standard methodology 
would be to run a probit or logit model. This standard methodology, however, is not 
appropriate for this particular case.   As is well known, standard finite sample 
maximum-likelihood estimates of probit or logit are biased. This bias vanishes as the 
sample size gets larger. However, King and Zeng (2001 a, b) show that this finite 
sample bias can be greatly exaggerated when one observed choice occurs rarely in the 
data. They develop a method called “rare-events-logit” to correct this enlarged bias 
due to the rare events data. Our sample contains a total of 6845 observations. The 
dependent variable takes on the value of one in only 98 out of these 6845 total 
possibilities. We, therefore, apply the rare-events-logit approach here.  
The first panel of Table 3 shows the regression results for the baseline model 
using standard logit model.14 The two Wald Chi-square statistics are 55.46 and 55.56, 
respectively, indicating that the overall models are significant at 1% level. All control 
variables have expected signs. REROV , RESIMP , and DEMOC are significant, 
meaning that countries that have low reserves, high real exchange overvaluation, or a 
more democratic political system are more likely to be attacked. KAPCON  has a 
positive but insignificant effect.  
 
14 We also estimate equation (1) using the probit model. The results are very close to those from the 
standard logit model and thus not reported here. 
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In terms of the monetary policy variables, the change in the discount rate is 
positive and statistically significant at 1% level. This evidence suggests that raising 
discount rates in advance actually increases the probability of a speculative attack. 
The estimated marginal effect is shown in brackets. Holding other variables at their 
means, a one percent increase in discount rate from its mean increases the probability 
of a speculative attack roughly from 0.82% to 0.85%. The change in domestic credit 
growth is positive but insignificant. 
As discussed earlier, given the nature of our data, the logit estimates can be 
largely biased towards zero. In order to correct the downward bias due to rare events, 
we re-estimate equation (1) using the rare-events-logit model. The second panel of 
Table 3 reports the results from the rare-events-logit regression.15 We get similar 
results for both the control variables and the monetary policy variables. The change in 
the discount rate is positive and significant while the change in domestic credit 
growth is still insignificant. In this model, raising the discount rate from its mean by 
one standard deviation (percent) increases the probability of a speculative attack 
roughly from 0.82% to 0.94% (0.86%). Clearly, this initial evidence does not show 
any general beneficial effects of tight monetary policy.  
B. Testing our model’s prediction 
The baseline model shows the overall effects of tight monetary policy on 
speculators’ attack decision but we are more interested in testing the conditional 
effects in different country groups. 
Our simple model predicts that high rates should be more effective in deterring 
 
15 The models are estimated using the relogit program written by Tomz et al. (1999) for Stata. It does not 
report the overall significance of the model. 
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speculative attacks for countries that have strong commitment on exchange rate 
stability. We have argued that countries with hard pegs care more about exchange rate 
stability than those with soft pegs. Therefore, if our model is correct, we expect to 
find a larger deterrent effect of high rates in these countries. To test this idea, we split 
the full sample into two subsamples according to their exchange rate regimes. We 
then run a rare-events-logit regression of equation (1) for each subsample.16 The 
results are shown in the first two rows of Table 4. The two panels in Table 4 
correspond to the two measures of monetary policy. To save space, we only report the 
coefficients, standard errors and marginal effects of monetary policy variables.  
An interesting result stands out: The effects of high rates are found to be 
significant but opposite in these two groups. In the hard peg subsample (HARDPEG), 
the coefficient on the discount rate is negative and the coefficient on domestic credit 
growth is positive. They are also both statistically significant. This result suggests that 
raising the discount rate or reducing domestic credit growth in advance lowers the 
probability of speculative attacks in countries that have de facto hard pegs. The 
estimated marginal effects show that, holding other independent variables at their 
means, raising discount rate (lowering domestic credit growth) by one standard 
deviation from its mean can lower the probability of a speculative attack from 
roughly 0.57% (0.56%) to 0.47% (0.44%). By contrast, the effect of high rates is 
significantly different in the soft peg (SOFTPEG) subsample in that raising the 
interest rate increases the probability of being attacked. Thus we find initial support 
here for the predictions of our model.  
C. Decomposing the Overall Effect in the Full Sample 
 
16 Exchange regime dummy is dropped for these regressions to avoid perfect multicollinearity.  
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The above subsample evidence suggests that an effective signaling effect exists 
in countries that have de facto hard pegs. As a formal test, in this section we 
re-estimate equation (1) using the full sample and replacing the monetary policy 
variable with two interaction terms of monetary policy and exchange rate regimes. 
This specification allows us to investigate the decomposed effect of high rates for 
each exchange rate regime. Table 5 reports the results. The interaction term between 
the discount rate and a de facto hard peg regime, HARDPEGDIR * , is negative and 
significant at 1% level. This evidence, again, suggests that high rates can effectively 
reduce the probability of a potential speculative attack in countries that have a de 
facto hard peg regime. The interaction term of discount rate and the soft peg 
exchange rate regime is also significant but with a positive sign, indicating that 
raising interest rates increases the probability of speculative attacks.17 Overall, the 
above evidence shows that signaling has different effects for hard peggers and soft 
peggers.  Specifically, hard pegger signaling deters attacks while soft pegger 
signaling does not. 
D. Robustness Checks 
This section checks the robustness of our empirical results and their sensitivity to 
different specifications and samples. Since it could be argued that speculative attacks 
can possibly occur in countries that have a managed floating regime, our first 
robustness check is to extend our sample to including these countries. This extended 
sample contains 9917 observations with 137 attacks. The rare-events-logit regression 
results are reported in Table 6.  
 
17 The two interaction terms between domestic credit growth variable and exchange rate regimes also 
reflect the idea that tight policy is a credible signal only in the hard pegging regimes, though the 
coefficients in this case are not significant. 
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The evidence remains strong in the extended sample as both HARDPEGDIR *
and HARDPEGDDCG * are significant and show that tight policy deters attacks in 
hard peg countries. It is also interesting to note that raising rates in managed floating 
countries increases the probability of attack even more than it does in soft peg 
countries. The general pattern is, the less commitment to the exchange rate regime, 
the less effective is interest rate signaling. 
In section 4, we use different threshold values for OECD and non-OECD 
countries to identify speculative attacks, following Kraay (2003). One may suspect 
that the results may possibly be driven by this identification methodology. To show 
the robustness of our results, we divide the full sample into two subsamples. One 
subsample contains only OECD countries and the other contains only non-OECD 
countries. We run the same regressions for both subsamples. The results from these 
two subsamples are shown in Table 7 and Table 8.  
These results are quite similar to those from the full sample as in both cases 
raising the interest rate significantly reduces the probability of attacks in the de facto 
hard peg countries but increases the probability in the soft peg countries. When 
comparing the two sets of results, it is interesting to note that a one standard deviation 
increase in the interest rate has a bigger deterrent effect in the OECD country sample, 
and that democracies are more prone to attacks only in the non-OECD sample. 
All in all, the results here tell a very consistent story: countries with a high 
degree of commitment to their fixed exchange rate regime can help deter an attack via 
interest rate signaling in a way that other countries cannot.  
1.6 Conclusion 
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This paper presents and tests a simple signaling model of high interest rates as a 
deterrent to speculative attacks.   The theoretical model produces outcomes that are 
novel to in the literature. Assuming both agents have two possible types, our model is 
able to rationalize failed signaling in a pooling equilibrium or a semi-separating 
equilibrium without relying on any out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Our model also shows 
that, although it is still possible for a weak monetary authority to hide his type in a 
pooling or semi-separating equilibrium, the effectiveness of signaling for weak types, 
however, is much less effective than that for strong types. In both equilibria, the weak 
monetary authority faces a higher probability of attack. In the empirical part of our 
paper, we find strong evidence that raising interest rates in advance has significantly 
different impacts in different country groups. It reduces the probability of attacks in 
hard-pegging countries but increases it in soft-pegging countries. This finding is 
robust to alternative measure of monetary policy and to different specifications and 
samples. Our results lend support to the hypothesis proposed by our theoretical 
model.  
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Data Appendix 
Variable   Source   Description 
Nominal Exchange Rate IFS  local currency units per US dollar 
Non-gold Reserves  IFS  in US dollar 
Money Market Rate  IFS   
Discount Rate*  IFS   
Domestic Credit  IFS  in local currency units 
Monthly Imports  IFS  in US dollar 
CPI  IFS   
Real GDP per capita  Penn World Table 6.1  in US dollar 
SOFT/HARDREG*/  Reinhart and   de facto exchange rate regimes 
MANAGEDFLOATING Rogoff (2003)   
DEMOC*  POLITY 4  an index of democracy ranges from 0 to 10 
KAPCON  IMF’s Annual Report   a dummy variable takes on the value one  
 on Exchange Rate   if a country has restrictions on capital 
 Arrangements and  account transactions 
 Exchange Restrictions   
 
Notes: We use Bank of England base rate for United Kingdom because its discount rate is not available 
in IFS after February 1981. 
We use Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003)’s exchange rate regime classification for Bangladesh, 
Rwanda and Trinidad and Tobago because they are not available in Reinhart and Rogoff (2003). We 
treat a regime as hard peg, soft peg, or managed floating if it is classified as fixed, dirty 
floating/crawling peg, or dirty floating in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003).  
Hong Kong’s economic data are drawn from the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. We use Singapore’s 
democ score as a proxy for Hong Kong because it is not available in POLITY4.
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Country List 
 
COUNTRIES 
Bangladesh Denmark Latvia Rwanda 
Belgium Ecuador Malaysia South Africa 
Benin Egypt Mauritius Spain 
Bolivia Finland Mexico Sweden 
Botswana France Morocco Thailand 
Brazil Ghana Nepal Trinidad and Tobago 
Bulgaria Greece Netherlands Tunisia 
Burundi Hong Kong Nigeria Turkey 
Cameroon Indonesia Norway United Kingdom 
Canada Ireland Pakistan Uruguay 
Chile Israel Peru Venezuela 
Colombia Italy Philippines Zimbabwe 
Costa Rica Kenya Poland  
Croatia Korea Portugal  
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Table 1.1 Identified Successful and Failed Attacks 
 
A. Identified Successful Attacks 
Country Time   Country Time   Country Time 
Botswana 1992M7  Indonesia 1997M9  Rwanda 1990M11 
Brazil 1999M1  Israel 1989M1  South Africa* 1975M10 
Burundi 1983M12  Italy 1992M11  South Africa* 1984M7 
Canada 1992M11  Korea* 1971M7  South Africa* 1985M7 
Costa Rica* 1981M1  Korea 1974M12  Spain 1967M11 
Denmark 1993M8  Korea 1980M1  Spain 1982M12 
Ecuador 1982M5  Korea 1997M11  Spain 1995M3 
Ecuador* 1985M11  Malaysia* 1981M10  Sweden 1977M9 
Egypt* 1989M8  Mauritius 1979M11  Sweden 1982M11 
Egypt* 1991M2  Mauritius 1981M10  Sweden 1992M11 
Finland 1967M10  Mexico 1994M12  Thailand 1984M11 
Finland 1977M4  Mexico* 1998M9  Thailand 1997M7 
Finland 1982M10  Nigeria* 1986M10  Trinidad and Tobago 1993M4 
Finland 1991M11  Nigeria* 1999M1  Uruguay 1982M12 
Finland 1992M9  Norway* 1986M5  United Kingdom 1992M9 
Ghana 1967M7  Peru 1967M8  Venezuela* 1984M3 
Ghana* 1972M1  Philippines 1970M3  Venezuela* 1986M12 
Greece* 1983M1  Philippines 1997M8    
 
Notes: * denotes the attack is identified in countries that have a de facto managed floating exchange 
rate regime. __ indicates that this attack is also identified in Kraay (2003).  
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B. Identified Failed Attacks 
Country Time   Country Time   Country Time 
Brazil 1997M11  Greece 1997M10  Philippines 1990M1 
Brazil 1998M9  Hong Kong  1998M8  Portugal 1985M1 
Canada 1976M3  Indonesia 1991M3  Portugal 1990M10 
Canada 1978M2  Ireland 1997M4  South Africa* 1975M3 
Canada 1981M7  Italy* 1980M2  South Africa* 1976M8 
Canada 1982M2  Italy* 1981M5  South Africa* 1980M7 
Canada 1984M6  Italy 1986M1  South Africa* 1981M9 
Canada 1990M5  Italy 1990M12  South Africa* 1982M3 
Colombia* 1995M12  Korea 1980M6  South Africa* 1982M9 
Costa Rica 1979M8  Korea 1983M1  South Africa* 1983M3 
Denmark* 1975M3  Korea 1986M1  South Africa* 1988M7 
Denmark* 1976M9  Korea 1989M11  Spain 1987M5 
Denmark* 1977M12  Korea 1996M8  Sweden 1976M4 
Denmark 1980M2  Malaysia* 1980M9  Sweden 1976M10 
Denmark 1984M12  Malaysia* 1986M8  Sweden 1980M2 
Denmark 1987M2  Mauritius 1976M8  Sweden 1988M5 
Denmark 1993M2  Mexico   Sweden 1990M2 
Finland 1976M2  Morocco* 1980M8  Sweden 1991M11 
Finland 1979M11  Morocco* 1982M9  Thailand 1978M2 
Finland 1980M11  Morocco* 1985M4  Thailand 1984M1 
Finland 1986M8  Netherlands 1976M7  Thailand 1985M3 
Finland 1990M11  Netherlands 1979M12  Thailand 1990M9 
Finland 1991M5  Netherlands 1981M8  Thailand 1992M9 
France 1968M10  Norway* 1976M4  Thailand 1994M6 
France 1969M10  Norway* 1979M6  Trinidad and Tobago 1988M1 
France 1979M9  Norway* 1992M11  Trinidad and Tobago* 1994M5 
Greece 1988M3  Pakistan 1991M3  Tunisia 1991M4 
Greece 1989M5  Philippines* 1983M2  Uruguay 1998M9 
 
Notes: * denotes the attack is identified in countries that have a de facto managed floating exchange 
rate regime. __ indicates that this attack is also identified in Kraay (2003).  
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Table 1.2 Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ATTACK 6845 0.0140 0.1176 0 1 
DIRt-1 6845 -0.0690 2.4959 -84.2000 95.0000 
DDCGt-1 6845 -0.2969 12.2017 -185.3830 90.2631 
DGROWTH 6845 -0.0386 4.8054 -34.7229 52.2454 
REROV 6845 0.0523 2.8515 -35.3055 82.7842 
RESIMP 6845 4.0526 4.6304 0.0071 46.5559 
DEMOC 6845 6.3644 4.0553 0 10 
KAPCON 6845 0.7313 0.4433 0 1 
HARDPEG 6845 0.4383 0.4962 0 1 
SOFTPEG 6845 0.5617 0.4962 0 1 
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Table 1.3 The Baseline Model 
 LOGIT   RARE-EVENTS-LOGIT 
DMP=DIR  DMP=DDCG   DMP=DIR  DMP=DDCG 
-4.8557*** -4.8554***  -4.8038*** -4.8040*** CONSTANT (0.5327) (0.5307)  (0.5320) (0.5300) 
 
0.0418*** 0.0013  0.0527*** -0.0002 
(0.0148) (0.0038)  (0.0148) (0.0038) DMPt-1 
[0.0003] [0.00001]  [0.0012] [0.00002] 
 
-0.0313 -0.0309  -0.0331 -0.0328 
(0.0223) (0.0222)  (0.0223) (0.0222) DGROWTH 
[-0.0003] [-0.0003]  [-0.0013] [-0.0012] 
 
0.2506*** 0.2491***  0.2484*** 0.2471*** 
(0.0458) (0.0458)  (0.0457) (0.0458) REROV 
[0.0020] [0.0020]  [0.0088] [0.0088] 
 
-0.1104** -0.1105**  -0.1025** -0.1026** 
(0.0460) (0.0457)  (0.0459) (0.0456) RESIMP 
[-0.0009] [-0.0009]  [-0.0032] [-0.0033] 
 
0.1720 0.1804  0.1605 0.1758 
(0.1897) (0.1883)  (0.1895) (0.1881) KAPCON 
[0.0014] [0.0014]  [0.0014] [0.0015] 
 
0.1033** 0.1034**  0.0993** 0.0994** 
(0.0496) (0.0494)  (0.0495) (0.0493) DEMOC 
[0.0008] [0.0008]  [0.0009] [0.0009] 
 
-0.6475 -0.6521  -0.6282 -0.6368 
(0.4071) (0.4059)  (0.4066) (0.4054) HARDPEG 
[-.0052] [-0.0052]   [-0.0051] [-0.0052] 
 
Wald Chi2(7) 55.46*** 50.56***  
TOTAL OBS 6845  6845  6845  
6845 
Notes: DMP denotes a certain measure of policy change. Cluster adjusted robust standard errors and 
estimated marginal effects are in parenthesis and brackets, respectively. *p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01.  
Marginal effects are estimated using the relogitq program written by Tomz et al. (1999) for Stata. They 
are estimated as change in the probability of a speculative attack for a one standard deviation change in 
continuous independent variables, a one unit change in the variable democ, and a zero to one change in 
the dummy variables holding all other variables at their means.
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Table 1.4 Subsample Evidence 
 
DISCOUNT RATE  DOMESTIC CREDIT GROWTH 
SUBSAMPLES  OBS  COEF  STD.E  MGE  COEF  STD.E  MGE 
HARDPEG  3000  -0.1423*** (0.0405) [-0.0010] 0.0160* (0.0089) [0.0012] 
 
SOFTPEG  3845  0.0532*** (0.0150) [0.0021] -0.0013 (0.0042) [-0.0002] 
 
Note: DMP denotes a certain measure of policy change. Cluster adjusted robust standard errors and 
estimated marginal effects are in parenthesis and brackets, respectively. *p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01. 
The hard peg dummy is dropped for these regressions to avoid perfect multicollinearity. 
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Table 1.5 Decomposing the Signaling Effect 
 
DIR DDCG 
-4.8050***  -4.8196*** CONSTANT 
(0.5322)  (0.5306) 
-0.1128***  0.0141 
(0.0359)  (0.0096) DMPt-1*HARDPEG 
[-0.0007]  [0.0009] 
0.0530***  -0.0015 
(0.0153)  (0.0044) DMPt-1*SOFTPEG 
[0.0011]  [-0.0001] 
-0.0333  -0.0324 
(0.0222)  (0.0223) DGROWTH 
[-0.0012]  [-0.0012] 
0.2483***  0.2465*** 
(0.0457)  (0.0457) REROV 
[0.0086]  [0.0089] 
-0.1028**  -0.0998** 
(0.0461)  (0.0457) RESIMP 
[-0.0032]  [-0.0031] 
0.1620  0.1827 
(0.1897)  (0.1881) KAPCON 
[0.0014]  [0.0014] 
0.0994**  0.1000** 
(0.0495)  (0.0493) DEMOC 
[0.0009]  [0.0009] 
-0.6238  -0.6174 
(0.4077)  (0.4069) HARDPEG 
[-0.0051]  [-0.0052] 
TOTAL OBS 6845 6845 
Note: DMP denotes a certain measure of policy change. Cluster adjusted robust standard errors and 
estimated marginal effects are in parenthesis and brackets, respectively. *p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01.  
31
Table 1.6 Results from the Extended Sample 
DIR DDCG 
-4.9832***  -4.9914*** CONSTANT 
(0.4603)  (0.4594) 
-0.1245***  0.0173* 
(0.0352)  (0.0098) DMPt-1*HARDPEG 
[-0.0007]  [0.0009] 
0.0498***  -0.0009 
(0.0153)  (0.0040) DMPt-1*SOFTPEG 
[0.0009]  [-0.0001] 
0.1352**  0.0035 
(0.0565)  (0.0095) DMPt-1*MNFLOATING 
[0.0012]  [0.0002] 
-0.0267  -0.0263 
(0.0220)  (0.0219) DGROWTH 
[-0.0010]  [-0.0010] 
0.1789***  0.1779*** 
(0.0406)  (0.0396) REROV 
[0.0119]  [0.0113] 
-0.1593**  -0.1588*** 
(0.0607)  (0.0604) RESIMP 
[-0.0042]  [-0.0043] 
0.2808  0.2980 
(0.1923)  (0.1916) KAPCON 
[0.0023]  [0.0023] 
0.0945***  0.0954*** 
(0.0352)  (0.0351) DEMOC 
[0.0009]  [0.0009] 
-0.2070  -0.2043 
(0.4548)  (0.4566) HARDPEG 
[-0.0017]  [-0.0016] 
0.3915  0.3895 
(0.3066)  (0.3072) SOFTPEG 
[0.0036]  [0.0036] 
 
TOTAL OBS 9917 9917 
Note: DMP denotes a certain measure of policy change. Cluster adjusted robust standard errors and 
marginal effects are in parenthesis and brackets, respectively. *p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01.  
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Table 1.7 Results from the OECD Subsample 
DIR DDCG 
-3.8041***  -3.9405*** CONSTANT 
(0.7800)  (0.7295) 
-0.7885***  0.1289** 
(0.2360)  (0.0649) DMPt-1*HARDPEG 
[-0.0029]  [0.0057] 
0.3093***  -0.0005 
(0.0596)  (0.0034) DMPt-1*SOFTPEG 
[0.0053]  [-0.0001] 
-0.0394  -0.0458 
(0.0385)  (0.0374) DGROWTH 
[-0.0013]  [-0.0016] 
0.2401***  0.2370*** 
(0.0512)  (0.0494) REROV 
[0.0103]  [0.0112] 
-0.2413**  -0.1860** 
(0.0962)  (0.0811) RESIMP 
[-0.0046]  [-0.0042] 
0.1743  0.2353 
(0.1845)  (0.1636) KAPCON 
[0.0022]  [0.0034] 
0.0331  0.0388 
(0.0835)  (0.0705) DEMOC 
[0.0004]  [0.0006] 
-0.9221*  -0.9284* 
(0.5228)  (0.5105) HARDPEG 
[-0.0105]  [-0.0113] 
TOTAL OBS 3109 3109 
Note: DMP denotes a certain measure of policy change. Cluster adjusted robust standard errors and 
estimated marginal effects are in parenthesis and brackets, respectively. *p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01.  
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Table 1.8 Results from the Non-OECD Subsample 
DIR DDCG 
-5.4651***  -5.5176*** CONSTANT 
(0.7972)  (0.7985) 
-0.1514***  0.0003 
(0.0317)  (0.0075) DMPt-1*HARDPEG 
[-0.0008]  [0.00003] 
0.0545*  -0.0306*** 
(0.0296)  (0.0101) DMPt-1*SOFTPEG 
[0.0010]  [-0.0009] 
-0.0319  -0.0257 
(0.0342)  (0.0339) DGROWTH 
[-0.0010]  [-0.0008] 
0.2581***  0.2660*** 
(0.0855)  (0.0861) REROV 
[0.0072]  [0.0074] 
-0.0424  -0.0343 
(0.0306)  (0.0299) RESIMP 
[-0.0012]  [-0.0010] 
-0.1455  -0.1408 
(0.4740)  (0.4734) KAPCON 
[-0.0008]  [-0.0007] 
0.1364**  0.1322** 
(0.0598)  (0.0597) DEMOC 
[0.0008]  [0.0008] 
0.0360  0.0734 
(0.6093)  (0.6105) HARDPEG 
[0.0005]  [0.0004] 
TOTAL OBS 3736 3736 
Note: DMP denotes a certain measure of policy change. Cluster adjusted robust standard errors and 
estimated marginal effects are in parenthesis and brackets, respectively. *p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01.   
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Chapter Two 
 
Speculative Attacks and Defenses as a War of Attrition: 
Theory and an Example 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Countries often use high interest rates or other tight monetary policies to defend 
their currencies against speculative attacks. In the recent currency crisis literature, 
there has been growing interest in further understanding the nature of an interest rate 
defense. According to conventional economic wisdom, a government can always 
defend its peg by raising interest rates, as a very high interest rate can make it 
prohibitively costly for a speculator to attack the peg.18 Also, a high interest rate may 
signal the government’s ability and willingness to defend the peg.19 On the other 
hand, the contrarian view suggests that raising interest rates to a very high level can 
be prohibitively costly for the government as well. The argument that a high interest 
rate can signal the government’s willingness and ability to defend the peg is not so 
convincing to a contrarian either because a high interest rate can weaken the 
government's fiscal position, thus making the signal less and less credible over time.  
In this paper, we argue that an interest rate defense during speculative attacks can 
be well modeled as a war of attrition game between speculators and the government 
under asymmetric information.20 In our model, maintaining the peg has value to the 
government, while the collapse of the peg has value to the speculators. Both values 
 
18 See Kraay (2003) for a discussion of the conventional and contrarian view. 
19 See Drazen (1999, 2000). 
20 Our paper builds from an observation made by Bensaid and Jeanne (1997), who state that an interest rate 
defense during a speculative attack is a war of attrition between the two sides. However, they do not develop this 
statement in the paper (that is, they do not solve a war of attrition model, nor do they consider the empirical 
implications of such a model). 
 
35
are private information. In addition, an interest rate defense by the government is 
assumed to be costly to both sides. In a pure strategy weak perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium of the game, each party's optimal concession time depends on its reward 
for winning and its relative waiting cost. The higher (lower) one's value for winning 
(waiting cost) is, the later one concedes. Of course, she who concedes last wins the 
war! 
Our modeling choice is motivated by three stylized facts of interest rate defenses 
to be discussed in section 3. Though the war of attrition game is standard in applied 
game theory and has been widely used in other settings, we are able to use it here to 
make significant contributions to the currency crisis literature.21 In particular, our 
model has the following features: 1) The model shows that an ex-ante rational interest 
rate defense can be either successful or unsuccessful. Existing models have difficulty 
explaining why, if defenses are costly, governments undertake them when the 
outcome is going to be failure; 2) We show that, in a pure strategy weak perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium, an agent’s optimal time until conceding depends on her value 
of winning and her relative waiting cost. Therefore, the model makes explicit 
predictions about variations in the duration of interest rate defenses, which we find to 
be supported in at least one important historical instance. 3) The model implies that 
even a very high interest rate cannot guarantee a successful defense. The relation 
between the level of interest rates and the outcome of a defense is likely to be 
nonlinear.  
 
21 There is a long tradition of borrowing models in the literature. For example, the model in Krugman (1979) is 
based on the model of Salant and Handerson (1978), and one of the models in Obstfeld (1994) follows that of 
Barro and Gordon (1983). 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews some relevant 
literature and Section 3 provides some stylized facts about interest rate defenses. 
Section 4 models an interest rate defense as a war of attrition under asymmetric 
information and solves for a pure strategy weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Section 
5 presents an example of how the model can be tested, and Section 6 concludes. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Theoretical studies on currency crises originate from Krugman’s 1979 seminal 
paper. In a Krugman style first-generation BOP crisis, the government does not act 
strategically.22 It responds passively to a speculative attack on the currency peg. As 
has been noted, the passive government assumption seems to be unrealistic because, 
in practice, governments often defend pegs aggressively by raising interest rates. In 
second-generation currency crisis models, the government responds actively to a 
speculative attack.23 It makes a strategic decision between maintaining and 
abandoning the peg by comparing the two costs imposed on its welfare. These early 
models do not focus explicitly on the role of interest rates during speculative attacks. 
 Existing theoretical studies on interest rate defenses can be divided into two 
categories. The first group includes work by Drazen (1999), Drazen (2000), and 
Angeletos et al. (2003). These studies make important contributions to the literature 
by correctly pointing out the possible signaling effects of high interest rates. In these 
models, given imperfect information about the government’s characteristics, 
speculators use observed policies to update their beliefs. Thus, under some 
circumstances, a tough government may find it optimal to raise interest rates prior to 
 
22 See Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984). 
23 See Obstfeld (1994). 
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a potential attack to reveal its type. What is ignored in these models, however, is that 
the “direct” effects of high interest rates. Governments often raise interest rates 
simply because they can directly increase the demand of domestic assets and 
speculators’ costs as well. 
The second group of studies focuses on these direct asset demand effects. These 
studies include Flood and Jeanne (2000), and Lahiri and Vegh (2003). These papers 
study the effects of high interest rates on the timing of speculative attacks in a 
Krugman first-generation currency crisis model framework. In these models, raising 
interest rates makes domestic assets more attractive, but it increases the government’s 
future fiscal cost as well. They show that it is not always feasible to raise interest 
rates in advance to delay a potential speculative attack.  
Although this literature contains many excellent papers, there are still some 
important things missing. In the following section, we discuss three stylized facts 
about speculative attacks and defenses that, in our view, a successful model must be 
able to reproduce. 
2.3 Some Stylized Facts of Interest Rate Defenses 
A. There are both successful defenses and unsuccessful defenses. This is 
well illustrated by two well-known historical examples: Hong Kong’s successful 
defense during the 1997 Asian crisis and Sweden’s failed defense in the 1992 EMS 
crisis. Both monetary authorities had fought fiercely to defend their currencies. In 
Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Government (HKMA) raised the overnight HIBOR to 
280% on Oct. 23 1997 to defend its currency board system. It also raised interest rates, 
though to a much less substantial level, during the next two waves of speculative 
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attacks in January and June 1998. In August 1998, the HKMA mounted operations in 
both the stock market and the money market to counteract speculators’ activities. The 
currency board system was eventually successfully defended.  In the Swedish case, 
the Riksbank initially took a very tough stance when the speculative attacks first hit 
the Krona peg in August 1992. By September 16, the Riksbank raised its overnight 
interest rate to over 500 percent annum. The first wave of speculative attack was 
defeated. Yet when a new wave of attacks came two months later, the Riksbank 
surprisingly floated the Krona shortly after a minimal defense. As these examples 
illustrate, an acceptable theoretical model must be able to explain this uncertain 
outcome of interest rate defenses and, perhaps more importantly, it must be able to 
admit a failed defense or attack as being ex-ante rational. In our view, this requires 
incorporating asymmetric information into the theoretical analysis.  
B. The duration of the battle between the government and speculators varies 
widely in different cases. For example, soon after the Asian financial turmoil hit 
Indonesia in July 1997, its monetary authority widened the Rupiah trading band from 
8% to 12%. On August 14, the monetary authority further replaced the managed 
floating exchange rate regime with a freely floating regime. The attack on the Rupiah 
lasted about a month. On the other hand, the battle between speculators and Hong 
Kong described above lasted about a full year, during which the HK dollar 
experienced four separate waves of attacks.24 
In our view, an acceptable theoretical model should be able to explain the 
systematic variation of the duration of speculative attacks and interest rate defenses. 
 
24 It is also the case that there are both long and short successful defenses and long and short unsuccessful 
defenses. See Section 5 below for more details. 
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Unfortunately, no existing model in the literature is able to provide a good 
explanation of this fact. Most of these models focus on the relationship between 
interest rates and the outcome of a defense. 
C. Empirical studies of interest rate defenses show that there is no clear 
statistical relationship between interest rates and the outcome of speculative 
attacks. Kraay (2003) is probably the most influential study on this topic. Drawing 
on large sample evidence, he finds no systematic relationship between interest rates 
and the outcome of speculative attacks. Using high frequency data for five Southeast 
Asian countries, both Goldfajn and Baig (1998) and Kamin (2000) fail to find any 
significant impacts of monetary policy on exchange rates. Though Hubric (2000) 
finds the nominal discount rate is negatively correlated with the outcome of a defense, 
he also finds that his measure for domestic credit is positively correlated to the 
outcome of a defense. The overall effect of tight monetary policy is ambiguous. This 
fact suggests that there probably exist a non-monotonic or nonlinear relationship 
between interest rates and the outcome of a defense. An acceptable theoretical model 
should be able to allow for this nonlinearity.  
In summary, given these stylized facts of interest rate defenses, an adequate 
model must be able to (1) explain the possible outcomes of interest rate defenses and 
allow ex ante rational unsuccessful attacks and unsuccessful defenses; (2) explain the 
systematic variation in the duration of a defense; (3) allow a non-monotonic or 
nonlinear relationship between interest rates and the outcome of a defense. 
2.4 An Interest Rate Defense as a War of Attrition 
In this section, we model an interest rate defense during a speculative attack as a 
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war of attrition game between the government and speculators under asymmetric 
information. We consider an economy in which there is a domestic government and a 
group of homogenous speculators. The assumption of homogenous speculators allows 
us to consider only one representative speculator in our model. Time is continuous. 
At time 0, the government announces a commitment to a pegged exchange rate, 
which has a value gV to the government. There are three main reasons why the peg 
is valuable to the government. First, a pegged exchange rate reduces the uncertainty 
of future exchange rates, thus facilitating trade and foreign investment, which is an 
important source of outside funding for many developing countries who have only 
limited access to the international financial markets. Second, a credible peg serves as 
a nominal anchor that helps keep the domestic inflation rate under control. Third, for 
some countries who have heavy foreign debt, a pegged exchange rate help reduce the 
debt in terms of domestic currency. 
We assume that, prior to a speculative attack, the government can maintain the 
peg at zero cost by setting the interest rate at its optimal level, which we normalize to 
zero.25 If there is an attack, however, the government has to raise interest rate to di
to defend the peg.  
A high interest rate imposes a cost, )( dg iC to the economy. Specifically high 
interest rates hurt the economy through three main channels. First, a high interest rate 
weakens the domestic government’s fiscal position by increasing its interest payments 
on the public debt. Second, a high interest rate often has negative effects on economic 
 
25 In reality, of course, it may require a different interest rate to maintain the peg even when there is no 
speculative attack. However, for our analysis, the level of this interest rate is not important. What is 
important is, in order to maintain the peg, the interest rate under speculative attack is more costly to the 
government than the interest rate when there is no attack. 
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activities because it makes private investment less profitable and consumer durables 
less affordable. Third, a high interest rate hurts the banking sector, which is a fragile 
sector in many developing countries. Therefore, keeping the benefits and costs in its 
mind, the government minimizes a loss function by choosing whether or not to 
maintain the peg.  
If a speculator attacks the peg successfully, her reward is sV , which can be 
interpreted as the potential profit (loss) that can be earned (avoided) from a successful 
attack. Since a speculator attacks the peg by selling short the domestic currency, 
raising interest rates increases her opportunity cost of selling the domestic currency. 
If she borrows domestic currency from banks and trades it for foreign currencies, a 
high interest rate also increases her financial costs. We therefore assume raising the 
interest rate from zero to di increases the speculator's cost by )( ds iC . For simplicity, 
we normalize )( ds iC to 1 and define )(/)( dsdg iCiCk = to be the relative cost.26 
The values of gV and sV are assumed to be private information. The cumulative 
distribution functions of gV and sV , )(VF and )(VH , and the corresponding 
density functions,  f(V ) and )(Vh , are assumed to be common knowledge. 
So in a speculative attack, speculators take a costly position gambling that the 
government will devalue the currency, while the government also bears a cost due to 
the high interest rates it chooses in an attempt to save the peg. During the battle, each 
party updates its knowledge about the distribution of its rival’s winning prize at any 
 
26 For simplicity, di is assumed to be exogenous in the model, though in principle the government 
can be seen as solving a broader optimization by choosing both di and its optimal concession time. 
This assumption is justified if the government has knowledge of k . It would then choose an di to 
minimize k since, as we shall show later, k is negatively related to its expected utility. 
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point of time based on available information. The battle will keep going until one 
party realizes her rival has more at stake and concedes. The model is solved by 
deriving each party’s optimal concession time, at which her waiting cost is equal to 
her value to winning times the probability that the other party will concede at the next 
instant.  
We denote the optimal concession times, by )( ggg VT β= and )( sss VT β= . We 
solve this game by deriving a pure strategy weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium in 
which one party’s concession behavior is described by a strictly increasing function 
)( ggg VT β= or )( sss VT β= .27 In this equilibrium, if the government behaves 
according to )( gg Vβ , speculators will find it optimal to concede according to )( ss Vβ
and vice versa. Since each party’s information updating process is perfectly 
predictable, their optimal concession times can be solved at the beginning of the 
battle.28 If we ignore discounting, the government's expected utility at time 0 is 
]|)[(][][)( gsgggsgsggg TTkTVETTprobTTprobkTTEU <−<+≥−= (1) 
The first term on the right hand side is the government’s expected total waiting cost, 
which is equal to its total waiting cost times the probability that it concedes earlier 
than the speculator. The second term on the right hand side is the government's 
expected benefit, which is equal to probability that the speculator concedes first times 
 
27 In fact, in the model there is a continuum of equilibria. The continuum is obtained by picking either 
one of the two sides in the war of attrition and letting an (arbitrary) interval of the highest waiting cost 
(lowest winning prize) of that side to concede immediately at time 0. By varying the size of the 
conceding interval, one can get the continuum. That is, the equilibrium we consider is obtained by 
using implicitly the selection criterion that no side concedes at time 0 with positive probability. See 
Martinelli and Escorza (2004) for details. 
28 Given that the distributions of gV and sV at time 0 are known, one can calculate the truncated distributions 
at any time t , },min{ sg TTt < .
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the differential between its winning prize and its total waiting cost conditional on 
having a longer optimal concession time. The government’s objective is to find an 
optimal concession time )( ggg VT β= to maximize its expected utility.29 
Denoting )()(1 TTV φβ == − and using the fact 
that ))(()]([][ gsgssgs THTVprobTTprob φφ =<=< , we have 
)](|)[())(())]((1[)( gssgggsgsggg TVkTVETHTHkTTEU φφφ <−+−−= (2) 
Substituting ssss
T
ggssgggs dVVhVkVTVkTVETH gs )()]([)](|)[())((
)(
0
βφφ φ −=<− ∫
into (2), we obtain 
sss
T
sggsggg dVVhVkVTHkTTEU gs )()]([))]((1[)(
)(
0∫ −+−−= φ βφ (3) 
Taking the first derivative of (3) with respect to gT and setting it equal to zero 
gives us the corresponding first order condition 
)]('))((1
))(()[( gs
gs
gs
gg TTH
ThTk φφ
φφ −= (4) 
The first order condition states that concession occurs when the marginal cost of 
waiting equals the expected marginal benefit from waiting. The left hand side of (4) is 
the cost of waiting one more instant to concede. The right hand side is the expected 
gain from waiting another instant to concede, which is the product of the winning 
prize and the conditional probability that the speculator concedes in the next instant. 
The second order sufficient condition requires that 
0/)]('))((1
))(()([ <∂−∂ ggsgs
gs
gg TTTH
ThT φφ
φφ (5) 
 
29 The government’s utility function and speculators’ utility function are assumed to be concave and twice 
differentiable everywhere. 
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Similarly, the speculator's optimization problem and its first and second order 
conditions are 
gggg
T
ssgsss dVVfVVTFTTEU sg )()]([))]((1[)(
)(
0
βφ φ −+−−= ∫ (6) 
)]('))((1
))(()[(1 sg
sg
sg
ss TTF
TfT φφ
φφ −= (7) 
0/)]('))((1
))(()([ <∂−∂ ssgsg
sg
ss TTTF
TfT φφ
φφ (8) 
Therefore, the solutions to the differential equation system (4) and (7) give us the 
equilibrium. 
Proposition 1 There exists a pure strategy weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
with each player's optimal behavior described by conditions (4) and (7). In particular, 
if both gV and sV have an exponential distribution with 1=λ , the concession 
functions )(VT β= , are defined by 
1)2()(
+== kgggg
VVT β (9) 
k
k
s
sss k
VVT
1
)1
2()(
+
+== β (10) 
(See Appendix for Proof) 
From conditions (4) and (7), it is easy to see that, in the equilibrium, a high 
interest rate cannot guarantee a successful defense.30 Given the winning prizes, it is 
really the relative cost )(ik that matters and there is no reason to believe )(ik
30 “Guaranteeing a successful defense” means that, ex ante, the government’s calculated optimal concession time 
is longer. Ex post, both parties would concede at the same time in equilibrium for it would not be a best response 
for the winner to wait any longer after its rival concedes. 
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decreases in i .31 This fact suggests there may exist a non-monotonic relationship 
between the interest rates and a successful defense. Therefore, our results are 
consistent with the empirical evidence. A very high interest rate does not guarantee a 
successful defense. The equilibrium of the game is such that, even though attacking 
(defending) is ex-ante rational, the loser of the war will experience regret. Therefore, 
our model justifies rational unsuccessful defenses and attacks. Also, notice that in the 
equilibrium, nobody concedes immediately as long as their value for winning is 
positive. Each agent's concession time increases with his winning prize and decreases 
with his waiting cost. Our model thus implies that the durations of speculative attacks 
will vary systematically across specific circumstances and one should be able to 
predict these variations with variables measuring waiting costs and benefits of 
winning. 
2.5 An example of the model at work 
Here we give a simple illustration of how the war of attrition model can predict 
variations in the duration of speculative attacks. We consider the 11 countries that 
were hit with speculative attacks according to the standard definition in the literature 
during 1997 and 1998.32 They are Brazil, Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan. We assume that 
during this time period, speculators faced the same ratio of waiting costs to benefits 
of winning so that variations in the duration of these attacks are due solely to 
variations in the countries cost – benefit ratios.  
 To measure waiting costs we use the size of the country’s foreign reserves as a 
 
31 One can immediately get 0/ <∂∂ kTg by substituting equation (4) into equation (5). 
 
32 See Kraay (2003) for a detailed discussion on the identification of speculative attacks. 
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percentage of GDP and a Democracy dummy variable that equals 1 if the country is 
rated higher than 5 (on a 10 point scale) according to the Polity IV database. The 
ideas captured with these variables are that countries with higher reserves can more 
easily afford to defend against attacks, and that countries where the government can 
potentially be removed by voters can less easily afford to defend against attacks, as 
defense measures often cause reserve losses and are also generally unpopular with the 
electorate. 
 To measure the benefits of successfully defending against an attack, we use a 
dummy variable for whether the country has a hard peg exchange rate regime (as 
opposed to a soft peg) according to the de facto classifications of Reinhardt and 
Rogoff (2003). A country that has made a strong public commitment to its peg most 
likely values it more strongly than a country that has not made such a commitment. 
We also use the size of the export sector relative to GDP as a second benefit measure. 
As export promotion is often given as a reason for pegging, a larger export sector 
would make the peg more valuable to any given country. 
 We then use a variety of sources (see Appendix 2 for details) to measure the 
duration (in days) of each of the speculative attacks on each country. These data range 
from about a week to almost a full year. The war of attrition model, along with our 
interpretation of the variables described above predicts that being a democracy is 
negatively correlated with duration, while high reserves, having a hard peg, and 
having a large export sector are all positively correlated with the duration of the 
attack. Panel A of Table 1 reports simple pair-wise correlation coefficients between 
our 4 variables and attack duration. For democracy the correlation coefficient is -.34, 
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for a hard peg, .41, for reserves, .41 and for exports .49. As shown in Panel B, a 
multiple regression using the two dummy variables (democracy and hard peg) to 
explain duration has an R2 of .42 with each variable correctly signed (i.e. democracy 
is negative and hard peg is positive) and significant at the 0.10 level. 
While this is only a small illustrative example, it does show that the war of 
attrition model has some empirical bite and hints that a larger study of the variations 
in attack lengths may prove to be a fruitful undertaking. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This paper argues that an interest rate defense during speculative attacks can be 
well modeled as a war of attrition between the government and speculators under 
asymmetric information. We show that, in a pure strategy weak perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium, each party’s fighting time strictly increases with its value to winning and 
decreases with its waiting costs.  
We show for the first time in the literature, the ex-ante rationality of unsuccessful 
defenses (attacks). We also show that, in our model raising interest rates to a high 
level may not necessarily defend the peg if it is more costly to the government than 
the speculator. There may exist a non-monotonic relationship between the level of 
interest rates and achieving a successful defense. Finally we show that the predictions 
of the war of attrition model for the duration of speculative attacks are supported by 
data from the 11 countries that endured such attacks in 1997-98. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
It is clear that the solutions to (4) and (7) are an equilibrium pair. In order to have 
closed form solutions, we need specify the forms of the cumulative distribution 
functions F and H . Suppose both gV and sV have an exponential distribution 
with 1=λ , we have 
VeVhVfVHVF −===−=− )()()(1)(1 (11)                            
Substituting (11) into (4) and (7) gives us 
)(')( TT
k
s
g
φφ = (12) 
)(')(
1 TT gs
φφ = (13) 
From (12) and (13) we know that 
1)]'()([ += kTT sg φφ (14) 
We also know that 0)0()0( == sg φφ . Therefore 
TkTT sg )1()]()([ +=φφ (15) 
 Equation (13) and equation (15) imply that 
TkT
T
g
g
)1(
1
)(
)('
+=φ
φ (16) 
The solution to the differential equation is 
cTkTg ++= )ln()1(
1))(ln(φ (17) 
1
1
)( += kg ATTφ (18) 
where c and ceA = are two constants. To determine the value of A , note that we have a 
symmetric equilibrium, if 1=k . Let 1=k , the symmetric solution to (4) and (7) is 
TTV 2)( == φ (19) 
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Thus, 1
1
+kAT should equal to T2 when 1=k . This gives us 2=A . Substituting 
(18) into (12), (13) and using the fact 2=A , we obtain (9) and (10).  Q.E.D. 
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Appendix 2 
Data Sources 
The reserves, exports, and GDP data employed in Section 4 are drawn from the 
International Financial Statistics (Feb. 2004) of the International Monetary Fund. The 
exchange rate regime classification used in Section 4 is based on Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2003)’s natural classification. The democracy scores are drawn from Polity IV.  
We use a variety of sources to identify the duration (in days) of each of the 
speculative attacks on each country. Our identification of the durations of Brazil, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Russia, and Thailand are 
based on “the Chronology of the Asian Currency Crisis and its Global Contagion” 
available on Nouriel Roubini’s Global Economics Monitor website. For Greece, 
Singapore, and Taiwan, we identify their durations based on movements in their 
discount rates and reserves. 
Taiwan’s data are drawn from the Central Bank of China’s website. 
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Table 2.1: An Illustrative Mini-test of the War of Attrition model 
 
A: correlation between our value of winning and waiting cost variables and attack 
duration in 1997-98 
 
Value of Winning 
 
Hard Peg dummy:  0.41 
Export Share:   0.49 
 
Waiting Costs 
 
Reserves    0.41 
Democracy dummy    -0.34 
 
B. A modest 11 observation, 2 variable regression: 
 
Duration(in days)i = 89.3 + 111*(Hard Peg dummy)i – 97.7*(Democracy dummy) 
 (2.3)  (2.03)                   (-1.84) 
 
R2 = .42, numbers in parentheses are T-statistics. 
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Chapter Three 
A Reinvestigation of Interest Rate Defense against Speculative 
Attacks 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Following a new wave of currency crises in the 1990’s, there has been growing 
interest in further understanding the role of interest rate defense against speculative 
attacks in the literature. According to conventional economic wisdom, a high interest 
rate helps defend the currency.33 It makes domestic currency denominated 
interest-bearing assets more attractive and increase speculators’ borrowing cost as 
well. Furthermore, raising the interest rate before an attack can signal the 
government’s willingness and ability to defend its currency.34 The contrarian view, 
however, emphasizes that a high interest would worsen a country’s fiscal position, 
and, therefore, may hasten a speculative attack and make it self-fulfilling. 
Theoretical models in the literature often incorporate both views. For example, 
according to Lahiri and Vegh (2000), raising the interest rate can delay the crisis but 
only up to a point. Otherwise it may actually hasten the crisis for a higher interest rate 
increases the government’s fiscal liability and imply higher future inflation. The 
model of Flood and Jeanne (2000) also shows that raising the interest rate makes 
domestic assets more attractive, but increases public debt service as well. Therefore, 
if a speculative attack is motivated by underlying fiscal fragility, raising the interest 
rate can hasten the attack. Drazen (2000) shows that the outcome of an interest rate 
 
33 See Kraay (2003) for a more detailed discussion of the conventional view and the contrarian view. 
34 See Drazen (1999), Drazen (2001), and Grier and Lin (2004). 
55
defense depends on speculators’ information about the government’s fiscal position. 
If the fiscal position is known, raising the interest rate may increase the probability of 
devaluation. Otherwise, it can decrease the probability. In Angeletos et al (2003), the 
government is willing to take a costly policy action only for a small region of 
moderate fundamentals, and this region shrinks as the information in the market 
becomes precise. Grier and Lin (2005a) model interest rate defense as a war of 
attrition game. A high interest rate is not sufficient to guarantee a successful defense. 
The consensus conclusion one can draw from these models is that an interest rate 
defense is a double-edged sword. It cuts both ways.  
The effectiveness of interest rate defense is ultimately an empirical issue. 
Empirical evidence in the literature on this issue is mixed. Using daily data, Furman 
and Stiglitz (1998) find that high interest rates are followed by exchange rate 
depreciations. Drawing on large sample evidence, Kraay (2003) finds no systematic 
association between the interest rate and the outcome of a speculative attack. Looking 
at the same type of data but using simpler statistical methods, Hubrich (2000) finds 
that different measures of tight monetary policies could have different impacts on the 
outcome of defenses. Discount rates have an unconventional impact on the exchange 
rate while domestic credit has conventional results. Drazen and Hubric (2003) find 
that raising the interest rate strengthens the exchange rate over the short-run but leads 
to an expected depreciation at a horizon of a year and longer.  
The objective of this paper is to empirically test whether raising the interest rate 
during a speculative attack can help defend the currency peg. This study is 
distinguished from previous ones in two aspects. First, previous empirical studies on 
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this issue look at sample observations drawn from the crisis periods. As I shall show 
later, these studies suffer a classic sample selection problem, and their estimation 
results are, therefore, biased. They confuse the effects of interest rate defenses 
conditional on speculative attacks with the unconditional effects. To correct this 
selectivity bias, I employ the full information maximum likelihood method to my 
sample which contains both the crisis periods and the tranquil periods. The empirical 
model that I estimate is following that of Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) and 
Maddala (1983), in which both the selection equation and the attack outcome 
equation have binary dependent variables. Second, I develop a rare-events-corrected 
probit model with sample selection to correct a second bias that is created by the rare 
events data used to estimate the selection equation. After controlling for other factors, 
I find empirical evidence that supports neither the conventional nor the contrarian 
view. Raising the interest rate during speculative attacks does not have significant 
effect on the outcome of a speculative attack. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the empirical 
models and the methodology. Section 3 addresses data issues. Section 4 provides my 
empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
3.2 Empirical Models 
A. A Probit Model with Sample Selection 
The statistical model can be specified as follows: 
iii UXSF 1* ' +=α (1) 
iii UZATK 2* ' += β (2)                          
where 1U )1,0(N , 2U )1,0(N , and ρ=),( 21 UUcorr . The first equation 
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regresses the outcome of a speculative attack on a vector of monetary policy variable 
and other factors affecting the outcome. *iSF  is an unobserved latent variable. What 
we observe is an indicator variable iSF , which equals one if *iSF > 0 and zero 
otherwise. In this case, *iSF > 0 if an attack turns out to be successful and *iSF < 0 if 
an attack fails. The second equation is the selection equation. A speculative attack 
occurs ( 1=iATK ) if the underlying latent variable *ATK is greater than zero. 
Otherwise, there is no speculative attack ( 0=iATK ). Equation (1) and equation (2) 
are related because one observes iSF  only if 1=iATK  and the two error terms iU1
and iU 2 are assumed to be jointly normally distributed with correlation 
coefficient ρ .
Heckman (1979) shows that a direct estimation of equation (1) would produce 
biased estimate as long as ρ is nonzero. I suspect that this sample selection problem 
exists in my statistical environment because the unobserved characteristics, which can 
affect the speculators’ attack decision, captured by the error term of equation (2) are 
also likely to affect the outcome of a speculative attack. After all, rational speculators 
attack a currency only if they believe that their attack is likely to be successful. Since 
both equation (1) and equation (2) have binary dependent variables, one can estimate 
them using either the two-step approach developed by Van de Ven and Van Praag 
(1981) or the full information maximum likelihood method. Under the assumption 
that the error terms are jointly normally distributed, the log likelihood function can be 
written as 
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Where 2Φ ( ) is the cumulative bivariate normal distribution function with zero 
means and Φ ( ) is the standard cumulative normal distribution function. The first 
term in the log likelihood function is the probability of speculators choosing not to 
attack, the second term is the probability of speculators choosing to attack with 
success, and the last term is the probability of speculators choosing to attack with 
failure. 
B. Rare Events Corrected Probit Model with Sample Selection 
As is known, standard finite sample maximum-likelihood estimates of probit or 
logit are biased. This bias vanishes as sample size becomes larger. However, King 
and Zeng (2001 a, b) show that this finite sample bias can be greatly exaggerated 
when one observed choice occurs rarely in the data. The sample that I used to 
estimate the selection equation contains 6765 total observations. The dependent 
variable takes on the value of one in only 96 out of these 6765 total possibilities. 
Therefore, maximum likelihood estimate of the selection equation can result in a 
large bias due to the nature of my data. King and Zeng (2001 a, b) develop a method 
called rare-events-logit to correct the bias. However, their method is not applicable in 
this study because it would violate the jointly normal assumption of the error terms. 35 
To address this problem, I shall develop a rare-events-corrected probit model with 
sample selection in the following part of this section. 
The rare events corrected probit model with sample selection can be developed 
 
35 An alternative method would be to apply the rare-events-logit technique to the second equation, and 
then use the generalized two-step selection bias correction method, which does not require the 
bivariate normal assumption, introduced by Lee (1982). However, this method requires tedious 
computation and is much more difficult to apply. 
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based on traditional two-step approach proposed by Van de Ven and Van Praag 
(1981), and Maddala (1983). It is a three-step approach. The first step is to estimate 
the selection equation using probit. The second step is to correct the rare events bias 
in the probit estimate. McCullagh and Nedler (1989) show that the bias can be 
estimated by the following weighted least-square expression: 
ξββ WZWZZEb ')'(][ 1−∧ =−= (4)                                        
where )'( WZZ is the Fisher information matrix. ξ is a 1×N vector with 
2/iiii Q ηξ = . iiQ are the diagonal elements of matrix ZWZZZQ 1)'( −= ,
and )]}'()'(/[)'({ 2 iii ZZZdiagW βββφ −ΦΦ= . Thus, the unbiased and consistent 
estimate, uβ , can be obtained from subtracting the estimated bias from the probit 
estimate 
∧β , bEu −==
∧βββ ][ . Also according to McCullagh and Nedler (1989), 
the variance of uβ can be approximately estimated as )()]/([)( 2
∧+= ββ VKNNV u
for small β .
The last step corrects the sample selection bias. Maddala (1983) shows that, 
under the assumption that the error terms are jointly normally distributed, the 
conditional mean of the error term in equation (1) equals the correlation coefficient 
ρ times the inverse Mills ratio, iλ .36 
iiii ATKXUE ρλ=> ]0,|[ *1 (5)                                                         
where )'(/)'( iii ZZ ββφλ Φ−= is the inverse Mills ratio, φ and Φ are the density 
 
36 This is only true when the variance of the error term is normalized to one. Otherwise, 
iiii ATKXUE σρλ=> ]0,|[ *1 .
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and distribution function for a standard normal variable. 
The selectivity-bias-free estimates, therefore, can be obtained by maximizing the 
following log-likelihood: 
))](1ln()1()(ln[)(
1
απαπα iii
ATK
i SFSFL −−+= ∑
=
(6)                                  
where ]/)'[( 2iiii X τρλαπ +Φ= , and 
)'(1]0,|[ 222 iiiiiii ZATKXSFVar λλβρτ −−+=>= .
The unbiased estimate uβ will be used to construct the inverse Mill’s ratio in 
equation (6). Notice that a direct estimation of equation (1) with the inverse Mill’s 
ratio as an additional regression using probit is invalid for the new error term is 
heteroskedastic by construction.             
3.3 DATA 
The dataset used in this study is an unbalanced panel comprised of monthly data 
for 49 countries, both developed and developing, from March 1964 to December 
2000.37 For some countries, there are some time periods excluded from the sample 
either due to their absence of pegged exchange rate regimes or due to data availability. 
Much of the data are drawn from Grier and Lin (2005b), including those identified 
speculative attacks and their outcomes.38 Table 1 lists all the identified attacks, 
including 36 successful attacks and 60 failed attacks.  
Following Kraay (2003), I consider two measures of monetary policy response 
in equation (1): a change in central bank discount rate (DIR) and a change in 
 
37 I actually started looking at a dataset that include all countries in the world. Those countries that are 
excluded from the sample are countries that had not had fixed exchange rate during those period or 
whose data are not available. 
38 See Grier and Lin (2005b) for a detailed description of the identification methodology. 
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domestic credit growth (DDCG). If the conventional view is correct, one would 
expect to see negative and significant coefficient on DIR and a positive and 
significant coefficient on DDCG. In equation (2), I replace a monetary policy variable 
with a lagged monetary policy variable. Lagged monetary policy variables are used 
because they are observable to speculators prior to attacks and are expected to have 
import impacts on speculators’ attack decisions.39 
Four control variables are included in equation (1). The first control variable is a 
measure of real exchange overvaluation (REROV) constructed as the growth rate of 
the real CPI weighted exchange rate versus the US in the previous 12 months. The 
second control variable I consider is a measure of reserves adequacy (RESIMP), 
which is calculated by dividing a country’s total non-gold reserves with its monthly 
import values. The third control variable is a measure of the point in the business 
cycle prior to the speculative attack (DGROWTH) defined as deviation of real per 
capita GDP growth in a country from its average in the five preceding years. The last 
control variable is a dummy variable for capital control (KAPCON). The control 
variables I consider in equation (2) include all the above 4 control variables and one 
additional variable NOA, which is defined as number of attacks occurred in history 
and is used to capture the historical vulnerability of a currency. Table 2 shows some 
basic summary statistics of the data. Detailed data sources and variable descriptions 
are available in the data appendix.  
3.4 Results 
A. Results from Simple Probit Regressions 
Table 3 reports the results of simple probit regressions of equation (1) without 
 
39 See Grier and Lin (2005b). 
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correcting for the selectivity bias. The two panels in Table 3 correspond to my two 
measures of monetary policy. The two Wald 2χ statistics are 41.92 and 47.40, 
indicating that both models are statistically significant at 1% level. Change in 
discount rate has a negative sign and change in domestic credit growth is positive, 
neither of which is significant. This evidence suggests that there is no significant 
statistical relationship between imposing tight monetary policy and the outcome of an 
attack. In terms of the control variables, DGROWTH, REROV, and KAPCON have 
expected signs and are statistically significant, meaning that speculative attacks are 
less likely to be successful in countries that either experience high growth, or have 
low real exchange rate overvaluation, or impose restrictions on their capital account 
transactions. RESIMP is insignificant, suggesting that a large reserve does not have 
the significant impact on the outcome of a speculative attack as one usually believes. 
B. Results from Maximum Likelihood 
Due to the selectivity bias, previous results of simple probit model cannot be 
taken seriously. One way to correct the selectivity bias is to jointly estimate both 
equation (1) and equation (2) using full information maximum likelihood. 
The maximum likelihood estimation results are shown in Table 4. The first 
column of each panel reports the results of the selection equation and the second 
column of each panel reports the results of the attack outcome regression. The results 
are quite similar to those reported in Table 3. Even after correcting for selectivity bias, 
the overall evidence still shows no significant relationship between monetary policy 
variables and the outcome of a speculative attack. The coefficients on DIR and 
DDCG are still insignificant. There is also some evidence that lagged monetary policy 
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increases the probability of attacks.40 In terms of the control variables, NOA is 
always significant and positive, indicating that countries that have been attacked more 
are more likely to be attacked in the future. Real exchange rate overvaluation has 
significant and consistent impacts in both the selection equation and the main 
equation. A high real overvaluation not only increases the probability of attacks but 
make these attacks more likely to be successful as well. A large reserve reduces the 
probability of attacks but does not have significant impact on the outcome of attacks. 
On the contrary, high economic growth and capital control both help defend the peg 
though they do not seem to have significant impacts on the probability of attacks. The 
two estimated correlation coefficients, ρ , are -0.792 and -0.694, both of which are 
significant. The first Wald 2χ statistics (with 5 degree of freedom) show that the two 
statistical models are significant at 1% level.  Finally, the second Wald 2χ statistics 
(with one degree of freedom) can be used to test the independence of equation (1) and 
equation (2). For both models, the null hypothesis that these two equations are 
independent can be rejected at 1% level. Severe sample selection problem does exist 
in the data.  
C. Results from Rare Events Corrected Probit with Sample Selection 
As discussed earlier, the finite sample bias of maximum likelihood estimate of 
the selection equation can be largely exaggerated because of the rare events data used 
to estimate the selection equation. The three-step approach developed earlier in 
Section 2 part B can be used to correct both the rare-events bias and the selectivity 
bias. The first step is to correct the rare-events bias. This can be done by using 
 
40 See Grier and Lin (2005b) for a detailed discussion of this perverse effect of raising the interest rate 
before attacks. 
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McCullagh and Nedler’s method. The first column and the third column of Table 5 
provide the estimation results of equation (2) from the standard probit model and the 
same columns of Table 6 report the rare-events-corrected probit model. It seems that 
bias is quite small. These two estimation procedures produce similar coefficients and 
standard errors, which are also close to the joint maximum likelihood estimators 
reported in Table 4. The only exception is the coefficients on DDCG. Compared to the 
simple probit estimate and maximum likelihood estimate, the rare-events-corrected 
probit model produces a much smaller coefficient on DDCG.  
The next step is to construct the inverse Mills ratio using the unbiased and 
consistent rare-events corrected probit estimates. Finally, after including the inverse 
Mills ratio as an additional regressor and taking care of the heteroskedasticity in the 
error term, equation (6) can be estimated using the probit model. The results are 
shown in column 2 and column 4 of Table 6 and the results from traditional two-step 
probit sample selection aer shown in the same columns in Table 5. The results are 
similar and are also close to those reported in the second column of each panel in 
Table 4. All control variables remain the same signs. The coefficients on DIR and 
DDCG are again found to be insignificant, suggesting that imposing tight monetary 
policies has no significant impact on the outcome of an attack. Furthermore, strong 
sample selection problem is once again identified in the data. The estimated ρ s are 
found to be significant in both models. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This paper empirically tests the effectiveness of interest rate defense against 
speculative attacks in a large unbalance panel dataset that covers 49 countries over the 
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time period from March 1964 through December 2000. My empirical evidence shows 
that there is no significant statistical relation between the interest rate (or domestic 
credit) and the outcome of a speculative attack. 
This paper makes two important contributions to the literature. First, it shows 
that previous empirical studies suffer a classic sample selection problem that could 
result in biased estimation results. Severe sample selection problem is identified in 
the data and is corrected by jointly estimate the equations using full information 
maximum likelihood. Second, I develop a rare-events-corrected probit model with 
sample selection that can be used to correct both the rare-events bias and the 
selectivity bias for datasets in which the selection equation is characterized by rare 
events. 
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Data Appendix 
Variable   Source   Description 
Nominal Exchange Rate IFS  local currency units per US dollar 
Non-gold Reserves  IFS  in US dollar 
Money Market Rate  IFS   
Discount Rate*  IFS   
Domestic Credit  IFS  in local currency units 
Monthly Imports  IFS  in US dollar 
CPI  IFS   
Real GDP per capita  Penn World Table 6.1  in US dollar 
Exchange Regimes  Reinhart and   de facto exchange rate regimes 
Rogoff (2003)   
KAPCON  IMF’s Annual Report   a dummy variable takes on the value one  
 on Exchange Rate   if a country has restrictions on capital 
 Arrangements and  account transactions 
 Exchange Restrictions   
 
Notes: I use Bank of England base rate for United Kingdom after February 1981 because its discount 
rate is not available in IFS since then. 
I use Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003)’s exchange rate regime classification for Bangladesh, 
Rwanda and Trinidad and Tobago because they are not available in Reinhart and Rogoff (2003). I treat 
a regime as hard peg, soft peg, or managed floating if it is classified as fixed, dirty floating/crawling 
peg, or dirty floating in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). 
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Table 3.1 Identified Successful and Failed Attacks 
 
A. Identified Successful Attacks 
 
Country Time   Country Time   Country Time 
Botswana 1992M7  Indonesia 1997M9  Rwanda 1990M11 
Brazil 1999M1  Israel 1989M1  Spain 1967M11 
Burundi 1983M12  Italy 1992M11  Spain 1982M12 
Canada 1992M11  Korea 1974M12  Spain 1995M3 
Denmark 1993M8  Korea 1980M1  Sweden 1977M9 
Ecuador 1982M5  Korea  1997M11  Sweden 1982M11 
Finland 1967M10  Mauritius 1979M11  Sweden 1992M11 
Finland 1977M4  Mauritius 1981M10  Thailand 1984M11 
Finland 1982M10  Mexico 1994M12  Thailand 1997M7 
Finland 1991M11  Peru 1967M8  Trinidad and Tobago 1993M4 
Finland 1992M9  Philippines 1970M3  Uruguay 1982M12 
Ghana 1967M7  Philippines 1997M8  United Kingdom 1992M9 
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B. Identified Failed Attacks 
 
Country Time   Country Time   Country Time 
Brazil 1997M11  France 1969M10  Pakistan 1991M3 
Brazil 1998M9  France 1979M9  Philippines 1990M1 
Canada 1976M3  Greece 1988M3  Portugal 1985M1 
Canada 1978M2  Greece 1989M5  Portugal 1990M10 
Canada 1981M7  Greece 1997M10  Spain 1987M5 
Canada 1982M2  Hong Kong  1998M8  Sweden 1976M4 
Canada 1984M6  Indonesia 1991M3  Sweden 1976M10 
Canada 1990M5  Ireland 1997M4  Sweden 1980M2 
Costa Rica 1979M8  Italy 1986M1  Sweden 1988M5 
Denmark 1980M2  Italy 1990M12  Sweden 1990M2 
Denmark 1984M12  Korea 1980M6  Sweden 1991M11 
Denmark 1987M2  Korea 1983M1  Thailand 1978M2 
Denmark 1993M2  Korea 1986M1  Thailand 1984M1 
Finland 1976M2  Korea 1989M11  Thailand 1985M3 
Finland 1979M11  Korea 1996M8  Thailand 1990M9 
Finland 1980M11  Mauritius 1976M8  Thailand 1992M9 
Finland 1986M8  Mexico 1994M5  Thailand 1994M6 
Finland 1990M11  Netherlands 1976M7  Trinidad and Tobago 1988M1 
Finland 1991M5  Netherlands 1979M12  Tunisia 1991M4 
France 1968M10  Netherlands 1981M8  Uruguay 1998M9 
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ATK 6765 0.014 0.118 0 1 
SF 96 0.375 0.487 0 1 
DIR 6765 -0.117 3.803 -231.400 21.940 
DIRt-1 6765 -0.070 2.510 -84.200 95.000 
DDCG 6765 0.004 10.504 -106.099 90.263 
DDCGt-1 6765 -0.158 11.179 -146.237 90.263 
DGROWTH 6765 -0.034 4.829 -34.723 52.245 
REROV 6765 0.057 2.865 -35.305 82.784 
RESIMP 6765 4.045 4.644 0.007 46.556 
KAPCON 6765 0.736 0.441 0 1 
NOA 6765 1.660 2.129 0 11 
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Table 3.3 Results From Simple Probit Regressions 
DMP=DIR  DMP=DDCG 
-1.193*  -1.171* CONSTANT  (0.631)  (0.615) 
 
-0.070  0.014 
 (0.094)  (0.011) DMP 
 [-0.018]  [0.004] 
 
-0.213**  -0.220** 
 (0.093)  (0.090) DGROWTH 
 [-0.054]  [-0.053] 
 
0.428***  0.439*** 
 (0.097)  (0.099) REROV 
 [0.109]  [0.106] 
 
0.013  -0.023 
 (0.129)  (0.104) RESIMP 
 [0.003]  [-0.006] 
 
-0.816**  -0.829** 
 (0.379)  (0.342) KAPCON 
 [-0.171]  [-0.164] 
 
LOG-LIKELIHOOD  -19.659  -19.772 
 
Wald χ2(5)  41.92***  47.40*** 
 
TOTAL OBS 96 96 
Notes: DMP denotes a certain measure of policy change. Cluster adjusted robust standard errors and 
estimated marginal effects are in parenthesis and brackets, respectively. *p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01. 
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Table 3.4 Results from Full Information Maximum Likelihood 
DMP=DIR DMP=DDCG 
ATK SF ATK SF 
-2.357***  1.272***  -2.357***  0.904* CONSTANT  (0.089)  (0.501)  (0.089)  (0.499) 
 
-0.034    0.012 DMP  (0.058)    (0.008) 
 
0.026**    0.001   DMPt-1  (0.012)    (0.023)   
 
0.077***    0.077***   NOA  (0.014)    (0.014)   
 
-0.010  -0.115*  -0.010  -0.145*** DGROWTH  (0.009)  (0.060)  (0.009)  (0.052) 
 
0.093***  0.211**  0.092***  0.270*** REROV  (0.021)  (0.090)  (0.021)  (0.075) 
 
-0.040**  0.017  -0.040**  -0.002 RESIMP  (0.019)  (0.084)  (0.019)  (0.085) 
 
0.038  -0.610*  0.042  -0.676** KAPCON  (0.074)  (0.320)  (0.073)  (0.335) 
 
-0.792***  -0.694*** RHO  (0.102)  (0.156) 
 Log-Likelihood  -445.962  -447.43 
 Wald χ2(5)  12.72**  17.67*** 
 Wald  χ2(1)  15.34***  8.11*** 
TOTAL OBS 6765 96 6765 96 
Notes: DMP denotes a certain measure of policy change. Cluster adjusted robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. *p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01. Equations are jointly estimated using STATA heckprob 
command.
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Table 3.5 Two-Step Probit with Sample Selection 
 
DMP=DIR DMP=DDCG 
ATK SF ATK SF 
-2.356***  1.499***  -2.355***  1.138** CONSTANT  (0.089)  (0.545)  (0.089)  (0.555) 
 
-0.030    0.011 DMP  (0.038)    (0.036) 
 
0.024**    0.001   DMPt-1  (0.011)    (0.002)   
 
0.077***    0.076***   NOA  (0.014)    (0.014)   
 
-0.010  -0.103  -0.010  -0.133*** DGROWTH  (0.009)  (0.079)  (0.009)  (0.080) 
 
0.093***  0.183***  0.092***  0.243*** REROV  (0.021)  (0.040)  (0.021)  (0.041) 
 
-0.040**  0.016  -0.040**  0.0003 RESIMP  (0.019)  (0.047)  (0.019)  (0.047) 
 
0.039  -0.569  0.042  -0.637 KAPCON  (0.074)  (0.392)  (0.074)  (0.402) 
 
-0.851***    -0.760*** RHO  (0.161)    (0.162) 
 LOG-LIKELIHOOD  -426.944  -18.943  -428.025  -19.363 
TOTAL OBS 6765 96 6765 96 
Notes: DMP denotes a certain measure of policy change. The Huber/White robust standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis for the main equation. Cluster adjusted robust standard errors are reported for 
the selection equations. *p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01. The Huber/White robust standard error are 
estimated using the SAS IML. The maximum likelihood estimates of the main equations are estimated 
using Eviews. Codes are available upon request. 
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Table 3.6 Rare-Events-Corrected Two-Step Probit with Sample Selection 
 
DMP=DIR DMP=DDCG 
ATK SF ATK SF 
-2.352***  1.533***  -2.351***  1.538** CONSTANT  (0.089)  (0.538)  (0.089)  (0.547) 
 
-0.028    -0.029 DMP  (0.038)    (0.036) 
 
0.027***    0.0005   DMPt-1  (0.011)    (0.011)   
 
0.076***    0.076***   NOA  (0.014)    (0.014)   
 
-0.011  -0.100  -0.010  -0.100*** DGROWTH  (0.009)  (0.079)  (0.009)  (0.081) 
 
0.092***  0.177***  0.091***  0.177*** REROV  (0.021)  (0.039)  (0.021)  (0.040) 
 
-0.036*  0.013  -0.037*  0.013 RESIMP  (0.019)  (0.048)  (0.019)  (0.047) 
 
0.036  -0.559  0.042  -0.557 KAPCON  (0.074)  (0.392)  (0.074)  (0.401) 
 
-0.861***    -0.862*** RHO  (0.157)    (0.158) 
 LOG-LIKELIHOOD  ---  -18.895  ---  -19.363 
TOTAL OBS 6765 96 6765 96 
Notes: DMP denotes a certain measure of policy change. The Huber/White robust standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis for the main equation. Cluster adjusted robust standard errors are reported for 
the selection equations. *p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01. The unbiased rare-events-corrected probit 
estimates and the Huber/White robust standard error are estimated using the SAS IML. The maximum 
likelihood estimates of the main equations are estimated using Eviews. Codes are available upon 
request. 
 
